Security Policy
Read the threat model first. Behavior it lists as out of scope is not a vulnerability.
Supported releases
| Release | Supported |
|---|---|
| Latest tag | Yes |
| Earlier tags | No: no fixes, and their images are not kept |
Reporting
Use GitHub Security Advisories: the repository's Security tab, then "Report a vulnerability". Do not open a public issue.
Include:
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Version | Release tag or commit |
| Component | Gateway VM, desktop VM, installer, build tooling or core/ binaries |
| Impact | What an attacker gains, and the preconditions |
| Reproduction | Steps or a proof of concept |
| Leak evidence | What leaves the guest and where it goes, identifying details redacted |
Process
| Step | What happens |
|---|---|
| 1 | Acknowledgment, then a verdict on scope |
| 2 | Fix developed privately |
| 3 | Coordinated disclosure after a reasonable window; credit at your preference |
Out of scope
| Item | Reason |
|---|---|
| Compromised macOS host | Defeats the guests entirely; documented and by design |
Public build passphrase (ombra-disk) on a fresh image | Published by design; it only opens a machine that has not been set up. A copy of an image taken before first boot opens with it and the original volume key. Failures of the first-use flow that replaces them are in scope |
| Accounts | Born locked (*) on both machines; no public login credential exists. First use sets the desktop user's password |
| Unlimited unlock attempts at the console | Each guess costs argon2id time; accepted under the physical-attacker model |
| Fixed argon2id parameters (1 GiB, 4 iterations, 2 threads) | Not benchmarked, so first-use setup stays bounded in a VM |